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F I O N A  S C O T T  M O R T O N  &  H E R B E R T  H O V E N K A M P  
Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy 
abstract.  “Horizontal shareholding” occurs when one or more equity funds own shares of 
competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the four largest mutual 
fund companies might be large shareholders of all the major United States air carriers. A growing 
body of empirical literature concludes that under these conditions market prices are higher than 
they would otherwise be. We consider how the antitrust laws might be applied to this practice, 
identifying a theory of harm and how it matches the law, examining the issues that courts are likely 
to encounter, and attempting to anticipate litigation problems. While the current literature on hor-
izontal shareholding does not offer a single robust explanation of how the price increase mecha-
nism works, we show that the “effects” test expressed in the Clayton Act does not require proof of 
the precise mechanism. Further, Section 7’s “solely for investment” exception typically will not 
apply. We also briefly discuss special problems of private plaintiff challenges. Finally, we elaborate 
the two ways that efficiencies are relevant to analysis of such mergers. 
authors.  Fiona Scott Morton is the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics, Yale 
School of Management. Herbert Hovenkamp is the James G. Dinan University Professor, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law School and Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
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introduction 
Horizontal shareholding occurs when a number of equity funds own shares 
of competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the 
four largest mutual fund companies might be the four largest shareholders of all 
the major U.S. airlines.
1
 A growing body of empirical literature concludes that 
under these conditions, market output is lower and prices are higher than they 
would otherwise be.
2
 Due to the twin trends of increases in the mutual fund in-
dustry and the rise of concentration in the U.S. economy, the impact of lessening 
competition due to common ownership by mutual funds has a potentially ad-
verse effect on consumer welfare. We argue here that the “effects” test articulated 
for mergers in Section 7 of the Clayton Act permits challenges to such mergers, 
whether or not the precise mechanism by which such mergers elevate product 
prices in a particular case is precisely known.
3
 
We adopt two assumptions throughout this Feature: first, the firms in a con-
centrated product or service market are not fixing prices in a way that would 
subject them to liability under Section 1 of the Sherman Act; second, the man-
agers of the funds that acquire interests in their shares are not agreeing with each 
other about how to purchase or vote the shares or otherwise influence the be-
havior of these firms. If either of these two horizontal agreements existed, it 
would be independently actionable under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Rather, 
this Feature considers the extent to which antitrust can be brought to bear 
against horizontal shareholding without proof of one of those two forms of ille-
gal agreement. 
Part I discusses the development of large-scale mutual fund ownership and 
evaluates the resulting threats to competition. Part II examines the antitrust legal 
theory justifying enforcement, including the Clayton Act’s plain language “ef-
fects” test. Part III explains why an “efficiency defense” is relatively unimportant 
 
1. José Azar et al., Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 72 J. FIN. (forthcoming 2018) 
(manuscript at 52 tbl. 1), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2427345 [http://perma.cc/7LNJ 
-KB98]. 
2. See, e.g., id. at 24; José Azar et al., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition 34-36 (July 23, 
2016) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2710252 [http://perma.cc
/DUK5-4KRC]. 
3. Aside from the Clayton Act “effects” test, consensus exists that the antitrust laws can reach 
this conduct. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1302-
04 (2016); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of Partial Ownership: Fi-
nancial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 565-67 (2000); see also Daniel A. 
Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1222-23 (2016) (noting the 
problem); David Gilo, The Anticompetitive Effect of Passive Investment, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1, 29-
33 (2000) (arguing that an antitrust solution is necessary but that the “solely for investment” 
limitation would preclude most antitrust challenges). 
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to such mergers. Then Part IV considers the Clayton Act exemption for stock 
acquisitions “solely for investment.” Finally, Part V considers the use of post-
acquisition evidence. We conclude that to the extent the empirical evidence war-
rants the conclusion that large scale horizontal acquisitions threaten reduced 
product output and higher prices, the existing tools of antitrust merger enforce-
ment are sufficient to support challenges to those acquisitions. 
i .  trends: increasing mutual fund ownership and 
increasing fund scale  
A. The Increasing Competitive Significance of Mutual Fund Ownership 
In the United States, the diversified mutual fund industry arose in the 
1970s.
4
 This model of saving and investing greatly benefits consumers by allow-
ing them to invest small amounts in a huge range of assets at low cost. The de-
velopment of the index fund also freed consumers from paying high fees for pro-
fessional stock-picking and instead allows them to invest in the whole market at 
low cost.
5
 Economies of scale in running a fund allow large funds to offer lower 
fees and greater diversification, two attributes desired by consumers. Funds like 
Vanguard and Fidelity were early and successful movers in the space and today 
have large market shares, along with BlackRock and State Street.
6
 
 
4. See Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of 
Corporate Ownership, and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 323 (2017); Joseph A. McCa-
hery et al., Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors, 71 
J. FIN. 2905 (2016); Kristian Rydqvist et al., Government Policy and Ownership of Equity Secu-
rities, 111 J. FIN. ECON. 70, 72 (2014). 
5. “A mutual fund is a portfolio of stocks that may have an industry focus (e.g., energy) or a 
strategy (e.g., growth). An index fund (which is a type of mutual fund) holds a portfolio of 
stocks designed to exactly mimic the index of interest (e.g., S&P 500).” Eric A. Posner et al., 
A Proposal To Limit the Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L.J. (forth-
coming 2018) (manuscript at 5), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2872754 [http://perma.cc
/34XQ-FW8R]. 
6. Azar et al., supra note 1, at 2 n.2. (“BlackRock was the single largest shareholder of one fifth 
of all American publicly traded firms . . . . Our analysis indicates that with now more than $5 
trn assets under management, BlackRock is also the largest shareholder of 33 of the FTSE 100 
companies (as well as among the top-5 shareholders of 89 of them), the largest shareholder 
of one-third of the DAX-30 companies; Vanguard, with more than $4 trn assets under man-
agement, is almost as large. [Jan] Fichtner, [Eelke M.] Heemskerk, and [Javier] Garcia-Ber-
nardo . . . calculate that the combined holdings of BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street 
make them the largest investor of 88% of all firms in the S&P 500.”) (citations omitted); Mat-
thew Keenan, Fidelity Manager To Retire, WASH. POST (Nov. 1, 2005), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103101655.html [http://
perma.cc/BGF2-KYJS]; see also Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top 
Management Incentives 3 (Ross Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328, 2018), http://ssrn.com
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By “institutional investors,” we refer to asset managers, companies that man-
age mutual funds, sovereign wealth funds, and any other entities that manage 
stock market investing on behalf of final owners. Institutional investors today 
own roughly 70% of the U.S. stock market.
7
 While the large mutual fund com-
panies listed above hold in the range of 4-6% of the U.S. stock market each, 
thousands of smaller asset management organizations together hold the remain-
ing approximately 50%.
8
 
Competition economists initially failed to recognize the impact of institu-
tional investors on competition, perhaps because the funds held small shares in 
competitors in absolute terms.
9
  The last two decades have seen a dramatic 
change: 
[W]hen combined, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street constitute the 
single largest shareholder in at least 40 percent of all listed companies in 
the United States . . . . When restricted to the pivotal S&P 500 stock in-
dex, the Big Three combined constitute the largest owner in 438 of the 
500 most important American corporations, or roughly in 88 percent of 
all member firms.
10
 
Just seventeen years ago, BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street combined were 
the largest shareholder in only 25% of the S&P 500.
11
 Similarly, fewer than 10% 
of U.S. public firms had institutional investors in common with product market 
competitors in 1980, while that percentage rose to 60% by 2014.
12
 Thus, the 
widespread occurrence of common ownership of firms that compete in the prod-
uct market, or horizontal shareholding, in this form is relatively new and has not 
yet attracted policy or enforcement action from the agencies. 
 
/abstract_id=2802332 [http://perma.cc/CTR3-7B5X] (“[T]oday both BlackRock and Van-
guard are among the top five shareholders of almost 70 percent of the largest 2,000 publicly 
traded firms in the US.”). 
7. The 2017 Investment Company Institute Annual Report says that investment companies man-
age $26.7 trillion in assets. Publicly traded stocks in America total $26 trillion in value. INV. 
CO. INST., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT TO MEMBERS 2 (2017). 
8. Id.; see Anton et al., supra note 6, at 3. 
9. The drought was broken by José Azar. See José Azar, Portfolio Diversification, Market Power, 
and the Theory of the Firm (Aug. 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract_id=2811221 [http://perma.cc/6JRW-2MBC]. 
10. Fichtner et al., supra note 4, at 313. 
11. See id.; Azar, supra note 9, at 2. 
12. Jie (Jack) He & Jiekun Huang, Product Market Competition in a World of Cross-Ownership: Ev-
idence from Institutional Blockholdings, 30 REV. FIN. STUD. 2674, 2674 (2017). 
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B. Competitive Effects of Horizontal Shareholding 
For a competition problem to arise from large shareholders holding product 
market competitors, those owners must have the incentive and ability to soften 
the intensity of competition, which harms consumers when pursued in an out-
put market.
13
 We begin by showing ability. Large shareholders engage in corpo-
rate governance, which may provide the ability to soften competition.
14
 Indeed, 
many activists have been encouraging better and increasing corporate govern-
ance over the last few decades, and we see evidence of large mutual funds engag-
ing in oversight of their portfolio companies.
15
 Fund representatives meet with 
management, give opinions, vote on compensation, and so forth. Fund manag-
ers typically accumulate all the votes they control from all their funds and fund 
families and vote them as one block in order to increase their influence.
16
 Cer-
tainly the funds themselves make statements indicating their belief that they can 
influence decisions of the firms they hold. For example: 
We engaged with roughly 1500 companies around the world in 2012. 
When we engage successfully and companies adjust their approach, most 
observers are never aware of that engagement. . . . We typically only vote 
against management when direct engagement has failed . . . engagement 
encompasses a range of activities from brief conversations to a series of 
one-on-one meetings with companies.
17
 
And along the same lines: 
 
13. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 518 (12th ed. 1985). 
14. Posner et al., supra note 5, at 14. 
15. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 814 (1992); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 
91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 11 (1991). For some early criticisms, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC 
and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837, 837-38 (1993); and 
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 
GEO. L.J. 445, 449 (1991). 
16. Glenn H. Booraem, Passive Investors, Not Passive Owners, VANGUARD (June 20, 2013), http://
global.vanguard.com/portal/site/institutional/ch/en/articles/research-and-commentary
/topical-insights/passive-investors-passive-owners-tlor [http://perma.cc/4PGQ-AZ5Z]. 
17. Fiona M. Scott Morton, Horizontal Shareholding: A Summary of the Argument, COMPETI-
TION POL’Y INT’L ANTITRUST CHRON. (Jan. 2018) (alteration in original), http://www 
.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/CPI-FSM.pdf [http://
perma.cc/DV4B-PGBB] (quoting text from the Blackrock website in 2013); see also Azar et al., 
supra note 1, at 36 (noting that unless direct engagement fails, Blackrock generally does not 
vote against management). 
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[B]y its nature, voting [is] . . . a rather blunt instrument. [E]ngagement 
with directors and management of the companies in which we invest 
provides for a level of nuance and precision that voting, in and of itself, 
lacks. So while voting is visible, it tells only part of the story. . . . We have 
found through hundreds of direct discussions every year that we are fre-
quently able to accomplish as much—or more—through dialogue as we 
are through voting.
18
 
The ability to soften competition must be paired with the incentive to do so 
if outcomes are to change. In standard economic models of competition, softer 
product market competition leads to higher prices and higher profits for the 
product market firm.
19
 A firm earning higher profits experiences an increase in 
its stock price, and any mutual fund holding that stock experiences higher re-
turns as a consequence. Funds benefit from higher firm profits in two ways: 
higher returns increase investment flows into the fund, and they may also in-
crease incentive-based compensation to fund managers themselves.
20
 These in-
centives and results are the same for other types of institutional investors, such 
as sovereign wealth funds, and all sizes of investors. 
The theoretical literature to date does not identify what mechanism funds 
may use to soften competition. One popular model assumes the management of 
the competing firms maximizes the profits of their owners (the investors in the 
funds), which they can do because they know how much each investor owns of 
their rivals in the industry.
21
 Alternative, and simpler, possibilities include: fund 
managers can encourage a common strategy among product market rivals; mon-
itor product market rivals; tie compensation to industry performance; raise the 
patience level or value for the future of rival management teams; or, most easily, 
fail to mimic the actions of an owner that holds only one firm. All of these at-
tributes appear as determinants of prices in economic models of multi-period 
competition.
22
 
 
18. Booraem, supra note 16. 
19. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 218-223 (1988). 
20. See Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers, 114 Q.J. ECON. 
389, 426 (1999); Edwin J. Elton et al., Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds, 58 J. FIN. 779, 780-81 
(2003). 
21. Timothy Bresnahan & Steven C. Salop, Quantifying the Competitive Effects of Production Joint 
Ventures, 4 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 155, 156 (1986) (developing such a model); see also Azar et al., 
supra note 1; O’Brien & Salop, supra note 3, at 571 (“[W]hen a firm acquires a partial financial 
interest in a rival, the acquiring firm’s unilateral pricing incentives to compete are reduced at 
the margin.”). 
22. See, e.g., B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, Multimarket Contact and Collusive Be-
havior, 21 RAND J. ECON. 1, 3 (1990); Joseph Farrell & Eric Maskin, Renegotiation in Repeated 
Games, 1 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 327, 328 (1989); James W. Friedman, A Non-Cooperative 
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A growing empirical body of evidence suggests that horizontal shareholding 
has led to higher prices in product markets. At this writing, analysis of the effects 
of horizontal shareholding is nascent compared to the analysis of coordinated 
and unilateral effects from mergers.
23
 Nevertheless, the academic literature find-
ing adverse competitive effects is growing.
24
 In highly concentrated product 
markets, shareholding by a small number of institutional investors is causally 
linked with reduced output and higher prices.
25
 Studies to date have covered the 
banking and airline industries, with others underway.
26
 The empirical literature 
also sheds light on a possible mechanism, with research demonstrating that in-
creased horizontal shareholding increases absolute performance compensation, 
which softens product market competition.
27 
Most of the studies use the MHHI, 
a modified version of the familiar Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
28
 to measure 
the extent of horizontal shareholding and common ownership.
29
 However, more 
work needs to be done before this metric can be accepted as the preferred basis 
for empirical work or litigation. In particular, we do not yet understand whether 
or what size of harms arise from large common owners compared to small ones, 
what constitutes “large,” the impact of total amounts of horizontal shareholding, 
or the effects of the ordering of owner size (for example, the largest owner com-
pared to a particular percentage amount of ownership). MHHI does not take 
into account ordinal impacts of ownership or the impact of communication. 
 
Equilibrium for Supergames, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 7 (1971); Edward J. Green & Robert H. 
Porter, Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87, 89-
90 (1984). 
23. John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement Actions and 
Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 648 tbl.A2 (2013) (including a bibliography that lists 
many merger retrospective studies). Another literature review can be found in Graeme Hunter 
et al., Merger Retrospective Studies: A Review, 23 ANTITRUST 34 (2008). 
24. This literature review below covers only academic and government research. Due to the in-
herent policy interest of the topic, there are now many industry-sponsored reports which we 
do not list here. 
25. Azar et al., supra note 1. 
26. Id.; Jacob Gramlich & Serafin Grundl, Estimating the Competitive Effects of Common Ownership 
4 (FEDS Working Paper No. 2017-029), http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=2940137 [http://perma
.cc/D8F7-JHWV]; Christopher Nosoko & Michael Sinkinson, Estimating the Competitive Ef-
fects of Common Ownership in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry (Feb. 2018) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author). 
27. Anton et al., supra note 6, at 2. 
28. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI, equals the sum of the squares of all firms in the 
market. For information on the derivation of the HHI, comparison to alternatives, and pre-
dictability of relationship between HHI readings and market structure, see HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 
12.4 (5th ed. 2015). 
29. Bresnahan & Salop, supra note 21, at 155; O’Brien & Salop, supra note 3, at 563. 
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Though the channel through compensation is one possibility, the mecha-
nism by which horizontal shareholding reduces competition is not yet known 
with certainty and may not be one of those discussed in the theoretical literature 
above. Indeed, there may be more than one mechanism, and mechanisms may 
vary by industry, over time, and by different patterns of ownership. As developed 
below, however, the Clayton Act does not insist on proof of the precise mecha-
nism by which prices are increased. It requires only a showing that the “effect 
may be substantially to lessen competition.”
30
 
i i .  legal theory and potential obstacles 
Both the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act can be brought to bear against 
anticompetitive horizontal shareholding. Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits 
“combination[s]” in restraint of trade, as well as contracts and conspiracies.
31
 
The triggering conditions are an agreement between two or more firms and a 
“restraint” of trade, which is a restraint on competition that has the actual or 
probable effect of reducing output and increasing price-cost margins.
32
 The stat-
ute itself says nothing about whether it condemns purpose or effects, and the 
case law reaches both.
33
 It also clearly applies to ongoing arrangements such as 
joint ventures that, while initially lawful, are subsequently modified so as to in-
clude agreements that restrain trade.
34
 Ever since its very first merger decision,
35
 
the Supreme Court has also applied Section 1 to completed acquisitions that 
leave no separate entities capable of conspiring once the acquisition has occurred. 
That is, Section 1 can be brought to bear against a “combination” even if the 
result is a single firm that is legally unable to fix prices with itself. The mere 
formation of the combination is sufficient to trigger Section 1.
36
 
 
30. See infra text accompanying notes 39-41. 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (reaching “every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, 
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade”). 
32. See 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTI-
TRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 1502 (4th ed. 2017). 
33. For example, naked price fixing is a per se violation even if the cartel was unsuccessful in 
raising price. See 12 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2004 (3d 
ed. 2012). By contrast, Sherman Act cases under the rule of reason require a showing of anti-
competitive effects. See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 158 (2013). 
34. E.g., Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 113-14, 120 (1984) (con-
demning the NCAA’s 1981 decision to restrict national broadcasting of football games initiated 
many years after the initial venture was formed in 1905). 
35. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). 
36. Id. The Court condemned under § 1 a series of transactions under which Northern Securities 
Co., a New Jersey holding company, acquired a controlling interest in the stock of railroads 
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Section 7 of the Clayton Act takes a different approach in three ways.
37
 First, 
it is triggered when one firm “acquires” either the stock or assets of another firm, 
saying nothing about ongoing relationships that do not involve an acquisition.
38
 
That is, the triggering condition must be the acquisition, whether of stock or a 
productive asset. 
Second, the plain language of Section 7 bases illegality on proven “effects”—
namely, when “the effect of such acquisition . . . may be substantially to lessen 
competition.”
39
 The statute says nothing about intent or state of mind,
40
 and, 
significantly, nothing about the precise mechanism by which competition may 
be lessened. As a result, the legality of the holdings does not require proof of 
exactly how ownership by these funds raises prices. This is not a novelty in mer-
ger enforcement. For example, in more conventional merger analysis, it is also 
the case that, although the HHI correlates both theoretically and empirically 
with higher prices, the precise mechanism by which competition is injured in 
any particular case may not be known. However, the “effects” test in Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act makes it unnecessary to determine the precise mechanism. For 
 
that had been competitors prior to the acquisition. Justice Holmes dissented, distinguishing 
earlier decisions such as United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), and 
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898), because these involved joint ventures in 
which the participants remained as separate entities and subsequently fixed prices. Justice 
Holmes complained that the only thing that could reasonably be challenged in the present 
case was the stock acquisitions themselves, since subsequent to the transactions the firms were 
effectively a single entity. N. Sec. Co., 193 U.S. at 385-88. For a contemporary analysis, see 
ALBERT M. KALES, CONTRACTS AND COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE § 139, at 127-28 
(1918). Tracking Holmes’s argument, Kales also criticized the decision, observing that while 
the common law condemned price fixing it had never condemned the mere acquisition of 
stock. Id. 
37. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
38. Section 7 can apply to the formation of a joint venture, provided that the vehicle for creating 
the venture is a stock or asset acquisition. See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 
158, 161 (1964) (applying section 7 to the formation of a joint venture where the venture was 
separately incorporated, and each of the forming companies acquired a fifty percent interest 
of the venture’s capital stock). In Penn-Olin, the district court had rejected both a Clayton Act 
Section 7 challenge and a Sherman Act Section 1 challenge. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. 
Co., 217 F. Supp. 110, 134, 138 (D. Del. 1963). 
39. Section 7 provides, in pertinent part: 
No person . . . shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock 
or other share capital . . . or any part of the assets of another person . . . where in 
any line of commerce or in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the 
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, 
or to tend to create a monopoly. 
  15 U.S.C. § 18. 
40. See 1 RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. 
AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW 88 (2014). 
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example, at the time a merger’s legality is assessed, antitrust enforcers may not 
know whether the firms are likely to raise price due to unilateral effects or some 
form of cooperative or noncooperative price coordination. The precise form of 
interaction does not matter as long as the structural analysis predicts that it is 
likely to occur.
41
 
Third, the Clayton Act itself clearly applies to both complete and partial ac-
quisitions (“the whole or any part” of stock or assets).
42
 The practices involved 
in horizontal shareholding generally concern partial stock acquisitions. The 
same kind of economic theory and evidence (conventionally used in merger anal-
ysis) justifies using Section 7 against horizontal shareholding. While Section 7 
of the Clayton Act contains an exemption for acquisitions “solely for invest-
ment,” the exemption does not apply if actual anticompetitive effects are shown, 
and particularly not if the holder is voting the shares in question.
43
 
We now illustrate the differences between Section 7 of the Clayton Act and 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act with an example. Suppose a large investor pur-
chases 20% of Alpha Co. and then later purchases 30% of Beta Co., which is Al-
pha’s competitor in a concentrated market. Section 1 of the Sherman Act might 
be applicable if the two acquisitions yielded a “combination” in restraint of trade. 
In Northern Securities Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court found such an un-
lawful combination when a single holding company acquired controlling inter-
ests in the shares of three formerly independent railroads.
44
 To the best of our 
knowledge, a Section 1 action has never been brought against parallel purchases 
of noncontrolling interests, but neither has a court ever required that the inter-
ests be controlling. Further, the “agreement” requirement applies to the stock 
acquisition, not to the subsequent use, and is present whether or not the interest 
 
41. On the abiding value of structural analysis and the correlation between market structure and 
anticompetitive outcomes, see Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Mar-
ket Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
42. 15 U.S.C. § 18. 
43. See infra Part IV. 
44. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 320 (1904). The government’s complaint alleged 
that the acquisitions injured competition: 
[B]y making the stockholders of each system jointly interested in both systems, 
and by practically pooling the earnings of both for the benefit of the former stock-
holders of each, and by vesting the selection of the directors and officers of each 
system in a common body, to wit, the holding corporation, with not only the power, 
but the duty, to pursue a policy which would promote the interests, not of one sys-
tem at the expense of the other, but of both at the expense of the public . . . . 
Id. at 322. According to the lower court the acquisition amounted to a “very large majority” of 
the shares of the acquired railroads. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 120 F. 721, 723-24 (D. Minn. 
1903). 
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is controlling. The “restraint of trade” standard does not require control, but 
only that the arrangement serves to reduce output and raise price. 
By contrast, Section 7 of the Clayton Act would be triggered by the Beta stock 
purchase (which is an acquisition); one would only then need to show that the 
effect may be substantially to lessen competition. The statute does not require 
the challenger to show that Alpha and Beta are going to fix prices or engage in 
other collusion-like behavior, which is unlawful only if it meets the Sherman 
Act’s agreement requirement. Importantly, however, the Alpha or Beta acquisition 
must be reasonably shown to be the cause of this noncompetitive behavior. 
Partial acquisitions are different from complete acquisitions in one important 
respect. A complete acquisition results in a single entity, making its subsequent 
decisions unilateral and thus not reachable under Section 1. For that reason, one 
cannot speak of an ongoing agreement among two completely merged firms.
45
 
By contrast, a partial acquisition typically leaves the acquiring firm and the re-
maining assets or equities of the acquired firms as distinct entities. That means 
that their post-acquisition relationship can still be governed by either Section 7 
of the Clayton Act or Section 1 of the Sherman Act, depending on the nature of 
the conduct. If the conduct is a further acquisition, then Section 7 could be 
brought to bear. If the conduct is an agreement that restrains trade, then Section 
1 of the Sherman Act applies.
46
 
Transactions leading to horizontal shareholding are “horizontal” mergers, 
even though each individual stock transaction is between noncompeting compa-
nies. For example, if Vanguard buys 15% of United Airlines, that transaction 
would appear to be neither horizontal nor vertical. The two firms are not com-
petitors, so no horizontal acquisition exists. Further, they do not stand in a 
buyer-seller relationship in the product market, so there is no vertical acquisi-
tion. However, if Vanguard should then buy 15% of Delta Airlines, the result 
would be that a single firm now holds partial ownership of both United and 
Delta, two competing airlines. As a result, the relevant merger analysis would be 
 
45. E.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (holding that 
a parent corporation and wholly owned subsidiary lack conspiratorial capacity). 
46. See, e.g., the Division’s press release accompanying the closing of an investigation of a partial 
acquisition involving Hearst and MediaNews (MNG): 
Because Hearst’s minority investment in MNG will not bring the companies under 
common ownership or control, interactions among them—including any changes 
in Hearst’s investment and related arrangements that affect competition among the 
companies’ Bay Area newspapers—will continue to be subject to scrutiny under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act as well as the other antitrust laws. 
Press Release, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division Regarding Its Investigation of Hearst Corporation’s Proposed Acquisition 
of Tracking Stock in Medianews Group Inc. (Oct. 25, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive
/atr/public/press_releases/2007/227168.htm [http://perma.cc/96SN-U5DB]. 
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of a horizontal merger in the airline industry involving a partial stock acquisi-
tion. 
In addition to Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the FTC to condemn 
“unfair methods of competition.”
47
 The FTC has independent authority to en-
force both Section 5 of the FTC Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The Su-
preme Court has held that Section 5 of the FTC Act reaches further than the 
Sherman Act,
48
 and its language does not contain an agreement requirement. 
Nevertheless, the courts have generally declined to find a violation based on con-
scious parallelism or other collusion-like behavior in the absence of a more-or-
less explicit agreement.
49
 Section 5 can be used to fill in “gaps” in the coverage of 
other antitrust provisions, however. For example, an unaccepted solicitation to 
fix prices can violate Section 5 of the FTC Act, even though it does not produce 
an agreement and thus does not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
50
 
Antitrust enforcement policy against horizontal shareholding by mutual 
funds presents some novel legal issues. Unlike the traditional merger case, the 
defendant may not be the company operating in the product market where com-
petition is threatened, but rather the mutual fund that has purchased some of its 
shares. The broad language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act clearly permits such 
actions, but drafting complaints will be novel in important ways. For example, 
should all large institutional investors be sued at once, or only a particular inves-
tor who has made a recent significant purchase? The former seems most appro-
priate, particularly when the accumulation of purchases of all diversified inves-
tors are contributing to the feared source of competitive harm. That is, a partial 
divestiture remedy will almost always require that multiple funds be ordered to 
divest some of their holdings. Further, the fact that mutual fund acquisitions 
typically occur incrementally rather than all at once may raise some issues under 
the ordinary time limitations that the legal system places on lawsuits—namely, 
the four-year statute of limitations on antitrust damages actions or the doctrine 
of “laches” which covers suits for equitable relief.
51
 
 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (2012). 
48. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966). 
49. E.g., FTC v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 729 F.2d 128, 140-42 (2d Cir. 1984) (declining 
to find that parallel but not expressly collusive behavior violated Section 5). 
50. See, e.g., Valassis Commc’ns, Inc., 141 F.T.C. 247, 249-52 (2006) (issuing a consent order). See 
generally 6 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶ 1419, at 147 (noting that because Section 5 
of the FTC Act has no agreement requirement, an unaccepted solicitation may be actionable). 
51. See 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶ 320. 
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i i i . efficiencies: substantive and remedial 
Merger analysis considers efficiencies at two different stages. First, agencies 
and courts must consider whether the acquisition itself produces efficiencies suf-
ficient to offset any anticompetitive effects.
52
 Second, they must consider the 
welfare effects of any proposed remedy. 
Substantive merger rules are heavily nuanced due to the widespread belief 
that mergers can lead to reduced costs, improved products or services, or better 
management. While nearly all naked cartels are challenged upon discovery, only 
a small percentage of mergers are challenged. That is so because we do not expect 
efficiency gains from cartels. If their only likely effects are negative, a harsh rule 
against them is in order. 
While the form of horizontal shareholding is a merger by stock acquisition, 
in substance the structure that is created resembles a cartel rather than a merger. 
The transaction, for example, of the purchase of airline shares by a mutual fund, 
does not create efficiencies in the downstream product market where the reduc-
tion in competition (such as air travel) is located. For example, being owned by 
a different mutual fund does not itself lower costs or improve the quality pro-
vided to the customers of the downstream firm, the airline. For these reasons, 
the merger rules governing horizontal shareholding should presumptively be 
harsh. 
Considering remedies, purchasers of mutual funds may be harmed by aggres-
sive application of merger rules to horizontal shareholding because merger en-
forcement will reduce the monopoly profits that result from the collusion-like 
effects. A private gain resulting from collusion is hardly a qualifying merger ef-
ficiency but only an anticompetitive wealth transfer. To the extent aggressive 
merger enforcement shifts resources away from shareholder monopoly profits 
and toward consumers who benefit from product market competition, it is con-
sistent with merger law’s consumer welfare principle.
53
 
Antitrust enforcement that prohibits funds from holding classes of product 
market competitors may also lead to a lower level of diversification for purchas-
ers of mutual funds. When a fund acquires the stock of a competitor of firms it 
already holds, then the transaction may create efficiencies by increasing portfolio 
 
52. On the efficiencies defense in Section 7 cases, see 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ch. 
9E. 
53. Under the consumer welfare principle, antitrust policy is driven by questions concerning the 
impact of a practice on output or price to consumers, disregarding gains to producers. See, 
e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Implementing Antitrust’s Welfare Goals, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2471, 
2471 (2013;) Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? 
Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336 (2010). 
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share diversity. Greater diversification within a fund lowers the variance of re-
turns and creates a product more attractive to consumers. This efficiency can be 
measured without much difficulty because index composition, portfolio compo-
sition, and stock return data are easily obtained. There is some evidence that the 
extent of this efficiency is small compared to the variance across existing mutual 
funds.
54
 We would not expect large gains in diversification from holding, for ex-
ample, the fourth airline, because the returns of firms in the same industry are 
highly correlated and are more highly correlated than returns of firms in differ-
ent industries.
55
 However, it is important to appreciate that adding or subtract-
ing the stock of a product market competitor does not change the expected re-
turn of the fund. That is, in theory, expected returns above those based on risk 
are equal across all stocks.
56
 There is no efficiency gain from the acquisition in 
the level of the portfolio’s return, only in any reduction in variance.
57
 
However, because the efficiencies occur in a different market and accrue to a 
different set of consumers than do the harms, it is not clear that either an enforcer 
or a court should consider those efficiencies at all before bringing a case or de-
ciding on liability, respectively. A standard application of the rule of reason under 
a general welfare test would suggest that an enforcer should compare the gains 
from additional diversification to the harms from higher product prices to deter-
mine the net effect. But it is not possible to carry out the customary combining 
of these two terms in a horizontal shareholding case because the gains accrue to 
owners of mutual funds while the higher prices are paid by consumers in the 
product market (for example, airline consumers). In Philadelphia Bank, the Su-
preme Court held that efficiencies obtained in a different market could not be 
used to defend against anticompetitive effects in the market that provoked the 
challenge.
58
 Philadelphia Bank therefore implies for this case that the anticom-
petitive consequences of the acquisition in the challenged product market (air-
line travel) could not be offset by any efficiency gains in the mutual fund market. 
And, as noted above, there are no other efficiencies for the authority to consider. 
 
54. William Goetzmann, Fiona Scott Morton, & Natalie Zhu, The Performance of Index Funds 
that Don’t Hold Competitors (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
55. Stefano Cavaglia et al., The Increasing Importance of Industry Factors, 56 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 41, 49 
(2000). 
56. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 
383, 392, 414-15 (1970). 
57. While theory would predict that changes in the way mutual funds invest their holdings could 
have macroeconomic effects, that literature does not yet exist. 
58. United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (rejecting the argument that alt-
hough the merger reduced competition in the market for smaller loans, there were offsetting 
efficiencies in a different market for larger loans); see 4A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 
32, ¶ 972. 
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The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) adhere to the Philadelphia 
Bank position on this issue, although they do state that the agency might exercise 
its prosecutorial discretion not to challenge a merger that produces significant 
efficiencies in a market other than the one experiencing the threatened anticom-
petitive effects.
59
 However, this is not a typical HMG example case of problems 
in small markets that cannot be remedied in an otherwise pro-competitive mer-
ger. Rather, the balancing of the convenient operation of the financial services 
industry against monopoly prices is likely sufficiently difficult to solve to require 
the involvement of additional governmental bodies. For example, if anticompet-
itive effects could be eliminated by changes in voting practices, Congress might 
want to pass new laws concerning the requirement to vote shares. Such laws 
could balance the beneficial effects of corporate governance against harmful less-
ening of competition. Similarly, Congress could alter the tax implications or 
ERISA regulations of different types of savings vehicles to favor those with the 
least anticompetitive impact. 
Two other facts are significant for present purposes. First, under the HMG, 
any claimed efficiencies would have to be sufficient to offset any price increase in 
the affected market.
60
 Efficiencies in the management of mutual funds will not 
have any impact, however, on product prices (such as in the air travel market). 
Secondly, the tradeoff described above between higher prices for goods and 
lower variance of stock portfolios varies greatly across consumers depending on 
purchasing patterns and stock holding. For example, about half of the U.S. pop-
ulation owns no stock at all. These consumers can only be harmed by mutual 
fund acquisitions that reduce competition and lead to higher prices or lower 
quality in the product market. Any evidence that the acquisition will tend to 
lower innovation, raise prices, or cause other harm to this group cannot be offset 
by any diversification efficiency, no matter its size. Relatively wealthy sharehold-
ers will be the group bearing any losses from the reduced level of diversification 
in mutual funds, though these individuals may offset those losses against the 
gains they receive from lower prices.
61
 
 
59. U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 30  
n.14 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], http://www.justice.gov/sites 
/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/9AAC-H2HE]. 
60. See id. at 29-31. 
61. The top 10% of the wealth distribution owns a significant fraction of mutual funds but are 
unlikely to depend on the diversification we discuss here due to their holdings of foreign 
stocks, private equity, hedge funds, and other real assets. See 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances, 
FED. RES. (2014), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/scf_2013.htm [http://perma.cc
/P2VH-YQ4Z]. The authors calculated this information using data from the 2013 Survey of 
Consumer Finances. 
horizontal shareholding and antitrust policy 
2041 
A mutual fund could raise an additional efficiency: it engages in better gov-
ernance than the previous owner, and this governance causes the firm to operate 
more efficiently. A “merger-specific” efficiency,
62
 which the HMG mandate,
63
 
would require the fund to show either that it is better able to govern than the 
previous owner or that it is bigger than other owners and therefore exercises 
more positive influence, even if it has the same ability to govern. In either case, 
however, a less anticompetitive alternative exists to the challenged conduct: the 
mutual fund can hold a different firm that does not compete with a firm it already 
holds. If the fund holds firms that do not compete in the same product market 
it will achieve corporate governance efficiencies without any anticompetitive ef-
fects. 
Section 4 of the Clayton Act
64
 permits private persons to bring treble dam-
ages actions for injuries caused by antitrust violations, including unlawful mer-
gers.
65
 Private lawsuits and class actions are very likely to begin to accumulate in 
this area. Settlements that create rules about which funds may hold which assets 
may begin to proliferate. This has the potential to cause huge inefficiencies in 
the mutual fund industry. Different funds will reach different settlements with 
different courts, which is likely to create a playing field that is not level across 
funds. Moreover, one court’s settlement may be inconsistent with another’s and 
hamper a fund’s operations. An additional risk is that a settlement is based on a 
benchmark that can change over time. For example, a fund may be found liable 
for lessening competition because it is the largest shareholder in two competi-
tors. If the fund is then enjoined from being the largest shareholder, it must de-
termine its asset acquisitions by monitoring what all other owners buy and re-
acting accordingly. Legal holdings may become illegal if the previously largest 
shareholder sells some of its stake. The process of choosing assets to hold in a 
mutual fund will become much more complicated and costly. Citizens who use 
mutual funds to save will be negatively impacted by uncoordinated private com-
petition law enforcement. 
A motivation for our enforcement recommendation is to generate some ur-
gency around creating a policy that prevents these harms. Here, the challenge is 
to devise a remedy that eliminates or significantly reduces the anticompetitive 
 
62. An efficiency is “merger specific” if, as a practical matter, it can be created only by the chal-
lenged merger. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, at 30 (“The Agencies 
credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed merger and unlikely 
to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or another means having 
comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed merger-specific efficiencies.”). 
63. Id. at 29-31. 
64. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2012). 
65. On private actions challenging mergers under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, see 2A AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶ 356. 
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effects of horizontal shareholding, while also preserving many efficiencies that 
ordinarily accrue to mutual fund portfolio selection and management. Such a 
balance could result in a set of enforcement actions and policies that achieve 
broad social objectives: competitive markets, low-cost savings vehicles such as 
mutual funds, and well-functioning capital markets.
66
 Whatever safe harbor or 
enforcement policy is chosen will certainly be challenged in court and must be 
carefully designed to fit within current law. 
iv. acquisitions “solely for investment” 
Section 7 contains an exemption for acquisitions that are “solely for invest-
ment.”
67
 While equity shares held by mutual funds might be considered as held 
for investment, they very likely do not meet the relatively strict requirements of 
this statutory exemption. The provision was intended to apply to passive inves-
tors who do not “by voting or otherwise” bring about or attempt to bring about 
a noncompetitive result.
68
 Ordinarily a statutory exemption applies to conduct 
that would otherwise violate the statute, but that is not how courts have inter-
preted the “solely for investment” provision.
69
 Rather, most have held that it ap-
plies only where the acquisition in question did not “substantially lessen compe-
tition” at all, which means that it would be lawful whether or not it was solely 
for investment.
70
 Two courts of appeals agree that the section was meant as little 
more than an assurance to purely passive investors rather than as a limitation on 
the Clayton Act’s coverage.
71
 One district court decision suggests that the “solely 
 
66. One possible solution is an enforcement safe harbor policy, as in Posner et al., supra note 5, at 
33-43. 
67. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012) (“This section shall not apply to persons purchasing such stock solely 
for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting 
to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition.”). 
68. Id. 
69. See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶¶ 1204a-b. But see Jon B. Dubrow, Challenging 
the Economic Incentives Analysis of Competitive Effects in Acquisitions of Passive Minority Equity 
Interests, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 113, 116 n.7 (2001) (criticizing this view for making the “solely for 
investment” exception “mere surplu[s]age”). 
70. See, e.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63, 172 (1971) (“[W]hen an acquisition will 
necessarily affect the competitive behavior of the two involved firms, it cannot be said that the 
sole purpose of the acquisition was for investment.”); see also 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 32, ¶ 1240b (examining other decisions that come to the same conclusion). 
71. See Gulf & W. Indus., Inc. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1973); 
Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1972) (affirming the FTC’s order 
in Golden Grain Macaroni Co., except regarding the divestiture of one company). 
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for investment” language removes the “incipiency” test from qualified acquisi-
tions.
72
 That is, ordinarily the statute condemns mergers whose effect “may be” 
substantially to lessen competition. However, if an acquisition is determined to 
be solely for investment, then the test for that particular acquisition is whether 
the acquisition actually brings about or is an attempt to bring about a substantial 
lessening of competition.
73
 
The courts have also been clear that an investment acquisition can violate the 
basic provision of Section 7, even though it is not of a complete or even a con-
trolling interest.
74
 As a result, a firm cannot make out the “solely for investment” 
claim simply by showing that the interest is noncontrolling.
75
 Control is not the 
issue; rather the issue is having enough power to influence firm behavior or per-
formance, or to block others from so doing. Whether the acquiring firm is enti-
tled to vote the shares is important, although not decisive.
76
 Several antitrust 
consent decrees have permitted acquisitions conditional on voting limitations.
77
 
 
72. Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1219 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
73. See id. 
74. See, e.g., Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co. v. United States, 387 U.S. 485, 501 (1967) (“A 
company need not acquire control of another company in order to violate the Clayton Act.”); 
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 602-07 (1957) (condemning a 
23% interest); United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426 F.3d 850, 862 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(reversing summary judgment against the government and explaining that a 50% non-voting 
(non-controlling) interest could violate the statute because “there may be a mechanism that 
causes anticompetitive behavior other than control” (e.g., common ownership might reduce 
the firms’ incentives to compete)); Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex, Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1225 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (explaining that a 20% block “frequently is regarded as control”); Gulf & W., 476 
F.2d at 695-97 (finding that 19% stock ownership was sufficient to influence the acquired 
firm’s policy); Am. Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-Am. Sugar Co., 259 F.2d 524, 526-28 (2d Cir. 
1958) (condemning a 23% acquisition); see also O’Brien & Salop, supra note 3, at 565 n.21 (list-
ing cases). 
75. See Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115, 123 (D. Del. 1981) (holding that an acquisition 
of a non-controlling interest did not necessarily fall within the “solely for investment” excep-
tion and explaining that “[t]hough the offeror’s avowed purpose may be investment, where 
the interest sought to be acquired is sufficiently large that influence or control is a realistic 
possibility, the Court is constrained to consider the potential anticompetitive effects of the 
acquisition”). 
76. E.g., Dairy Farmers, 426 F.3d at 860 n.3 (positing that the lack of control was not decisive of 
the “solely for investment” limitation); United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 
1093, 1098-99 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (permitting the acquisition because the acquiring firm was 
contractually limited in its voting of the acquired stock); cf. United States v. Gillette Co., 55 
Fed. Reg. 28312 (Dep’t of Justice July 10, 1990) (permitting an acquisition “solely for invest-
ment” when an investor promised not to seek a position on the board of directors nor to vote 
in a way that might lessen competition). 
77. E.g., Time Warner, Inc., 61 Fed. Reg. 50301, 50308-09 (Fed. Trade Comm’n Sept. 25, 1996) 
(proposed consent agreement) (requiring the divestiture of a 7.5% equity position or ac-
ceptance of capped non-voting shares); Gillette Co., 55 Fed. Reg. 12567, 12570 (Dep’t of Justice 
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It is doubtful that such limitations would be effective in combating the anticom-
petitive effects of horizontal shareholding.
78
 
Finally, an acquisition that is regarded as solely for investment and lawful at 
the time it is made may later become unlawful. In DuPont, the Supreme Court 
held that the “solely for investment” provision resulted in nonimmunity for an 
acquisition that was thought to be harmless when made but that later was used 
by the parties to produce anticompetitive results.
79
 This holding adds an im-
portant element to ordinary Section 7 coverage. While the statute itself applies 
only to acquisitions, the “solely for investment” provision considers both the 
original acquisition and the subsequent use of the acquired shares. 
In all, nothing in the statute or case law stands in the way of merger decrees 
that seek to control anticompetitive outcomes by limiting a shareholder’s ability 
to vote its shares. Of course, this does not mean that such remedies are appro-
priate on welfare grounds, but only that they appear to be legally permissible. 
v. post-acquisition evidence 
Since the passage of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (“HSR”)
80
 and establish-
ment of pre-merger notification in 1976, most mergers are challenged before 
they occur. As a result, there is generally no “post-acquisition” evidence to con-
sider. Nevertheless, the statute also condemns anticompetitive, completed acqui-
sitions, and both the government and private plaintiffs are empowered to pursue 
mergers that have already been consummated. Thus, government agencies con-
tinue to pursue completed acquisitions, even though HSR gives them an oppor-
tunity to use pre-acquisition challenges.
81
 
 
Apr. 4, 1990) (proposed final judgment) (imposing restrictions on how Gillette’s votes could 
be cast); cf. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 45 Fed. Reg. 69314, 69317 (Dep’t of Justice Oct. 20, 1980) 
(proposed final judgment) (explaining an agreement under which the defendant would not 
vote its shares during the period of stage divestiture); see also O’Brien & Salop, supra note 3, 
at 565 n.22 (listing consent decrees); Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, The Competitive 
Effects of Passive Minority Equity Interests: Reply, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 611, 612 (2001) (arguing 
that minority ownership can alter economic incentives, but that consent decrees can limit the 
influence of shareholders).  For a critique, see Dubrow, supra note 69, at 114. 
78. There are other ways for a mutual fund to influence management, such as selling stock. See 
Posner et al., supra note 5, at 44. 
79. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 588-89, 606. The merger was challenged some forty 
years after the acquisition; further, it was vertical and on a dubious “captive purchaser” theory. 
Id. at 598-99. 
80. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)). 
81. See, e.g., Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. v. FTC, 534 F.3d 410, 420-21 (5th Cir. 2008); In re Ev-
anston Nw. Healthcare Corp. Antitrust Litig., No. 07 C 04446, 2016 WL 4720014, at *4 (N.D. 
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While relevant to both partial and complete acquisitions, post-acquisition 
developments are particularly important in cases involving the former.
82
 Com-
plete acquisitions create a single firm, and the antitrust laws apply only to the 
“acquisition.” Any evidence of anticompetitive performance or conduct occurring 
after the merger must be shown to result from the acquisition itself. Causation 
is problematic when a firm whose full merger appears harmless when made but 
is thought to become anticompetitive later.
83
 
Partial acquisitions of either stock or assets are a different matter.
84
 Assuming 
the merger was horizontal, a competitive relationship continues to exist between 
the two firms.
85
 As noted previously, that relationship continues to be governed 
by Section 1 of the Sherman Act if it involves an agreement. In addition, any 
further acquisition of stock could be analyzed under Section 7. In general, the 
effect on competition is assessed as of the time of trial, not at the time of acqui-
sition.
86
 
What about a partial acquisition solely for the purposes of investment that is 
either not challenged or approved initially, but that subsequently poses a threat 
to competition? The provision governing purchases for purposes of investment 
does not separately speak to that issue, but the general merger law is clear: at 
least in the case of government plaintiffs, a consummated acquisition can be 
challenged at the point that it becomes anticompetitive, even if that occurs long 
after the acquisition itself.
87
 In du Pont, the Supreme Court held that these post-
merger actions were governed by Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
88
 The Court 
largely ignored Section 1 of the Sherman Act even though the government had 
brought its action under both provisions and actually emphasized the Sherman 
Act in the previous litigation. The anticompetitive conduct of which the govern-
ment complained was a series of input provision agreements for automobile fab-
rics and finishes in which General Motors allegedly favored Du Pont over rival 
 
Ill. Sept. 9, 2016); United States v. Bazaarvoice, Inc., No. 13-CV-00133, 2014 WL 203966, at 
*1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2014). 
82. See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶1203e. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. ¶1205c3 (explaining that there are “many distinctions” that make an investment-only 
“time-of-suit rule” inappropriate for complete mergers). 
85. See id. ¶ 1203c (discussing the potential anticompetitive consequences of a horizontal partial 
acquisition). 
86. United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505 (1974) (noting that “the essential 
question remains whether the probability of such future impact exists at the time of trial”); 
Chi. Bridge & Iron, 534 F.3d at 435. 
87. See 5 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, ¶1204e (advocating for the same rule for the pur-
poses of the investment provision as well). 
88. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597-98, 607 (1957). 
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suppliers.
89
 None of these agreements was an “acquisition” in the merger sense. 
Justice Burton, joined by Justice Frankfurter, dissented. He faulted the majority 
for abandoning the Sherman Act issues and relying exclusively on Section 7.
90
 
He then developed in a lengthy argument his objections, concluding that the 
Court erred in: 
(1) applying [Section] 7 to a vertical acquisition; (2) holding that the 
time chosen by the Government in bringing the action is controlling ra-
ther than the time of the stock acquisition itself; and (3) concluding, in 
disregard of the findings of fact of the trial court, that the facts of this 
case fall within its theory of illegality.
91
 
But the fact is that the four-member majority
92
 had done exactly what Justice 
Burton said.
93
 Of these, the most relevant for our purposes is the second holding 
that the appraisal of a partial stock acquisition must occur as of the time of suit 
rather than the time of acquisition. This seems quite consistent with the lan-
guage of the “solely for investment” provision, which speaks of someone who 
has made such an investment “not using the same by voting or otherwise to 
bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of com-
petition.”
94
 That is, this language clearly refers to conduct that occurs subsequent 
to the acquisition, and the relevant conduct (“voting or otherwise”) is clearly not 
limited to acquisitions. Of course, the Supreme Court majority did more than 
use the post-acquisition conduct to conclude that the “solely for investment” 
limitation did not apply; it also used the same evidence to condemn the merger, 
in an action brought some forty years after the merger had occurred. 
 
89. Id. at 588-89. 
90. Id. at 609. In fact, the acquisitions were purely vertical and occurred during the period be-
tween 1917 and 1919. Section 7 was not amended so as to reach vertical acquisitions until 1950, 
so these stock purchases were not even reachable under the Act unless (1) Section 7 as 
amended in 1950 was to be applied retroactively; or (2) Section 7 somehow applied to the 
subsequent preferential dealing insofar as it occurred after 1950. See id. at 612 n.3 (Burton, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the Section 7 amendments were inapplicable to acquisitions made 
before 1950). 
91. Id. at 611. 
92. Justices Burton and Frankfurter dissented. Justices Clark, Harlan and Whittaker did not par-
ticipate. See id. at 608 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
93. The Supreme Court subsequently acknowledged this in United States v. ITT Continental Bak-
ing Co. 420 U.S. 223, 242 (1975), noting that the DuPont decision “held that there is a violation 
‘any time when the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect. . . .’ Thus, there can 
be a violation at some later time even if there was clearly no violation—no realistic threat of 
restraint of commerce or creation of a monopoly—at the time of the initial acts of acquisition.” 
94. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
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To summarize, the competitive effects of partial stock acquisitions, including 
horizontal shareholding, can generally be appraised as of the time of the lawsuit. 
This entails that the challenge is not merely to the “acquisition,” but also to post-
acquisition performance or behavior. 
conclusion 
Section 7 enables the antitrust enforcement agencies to reach back in time 
and aggregate small purchases, which is critical in enforcement against institu-
tional investors that slowly accumulate large positions over time. As decades of 
merger enforcement has established, it is not necessary for a challenger to artic-
ulate exactly how harmful coordinated interaction might occur, but only to show 
a likelihood that it will occur. This remains a critical difference between Section 
1 of the Sherman Act and the more prophylactic reach of Section 7 of the Clayton 
Act, in addition to placing a premium on the use of empirical evidence. 
Nevertheless, significant issues remain unresolved, pertaining to both legal 
substance and the design of effective remedies. Section 1 of the Sherman Act may 
still be a useful agency tool when the challenged conduct involves agreement-
driven conduct other than an acquisition. On the question of remedy, partial di-
vestitures currently seem to be the most promising, although care must be taken 
that they are properly coordinated across all segments of a market. 
In sum, Section 7 of the Clayton Act presents a promising vehicle for com-
batting the anticompetitive effects of horizontal shareholding. An acquisition 
should be enjoined when the acquisition causes competitive harm in the product 
market in which institutional investors acquire the stock of two or more compet-
itors. While more research into where these effects are likely to be strongest is 
needed, current theory would point towards industries where fund overlaps are 
large, holdings as a share of product market firms are significant, and the prod-
uct market is already concentrated. 
 
